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STATE OF UTAH 
JERROLD L. DAVIS dba 
JERRY DAVIS AND ASSOCIATES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation, 
dba PIONEER TRAILER PARK, SANDRA H. FLINDERS, 
KATHRYN B. HEATH, DOROTHY A. HOUSLEY, 
BONNIE J. BRINTON, HELEN YOUNG, MARY FRANCIS 
BENNION, LAWRENCE T. HEATH, CAROLYN H. MARLER, 
NANCY H. FERRIN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
DOROTHY A. HOUSLEY AND BONNIE J. BRINTON, 
Cross-Complainants-Respondents, 
vs 
HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation, 
dba PIONEER TRAILER PARK, 
Cross-Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENTS' BR] 
Case No. 1454S 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover a real estate commission by 
the Plaintiff, a duly licensed real estate broker, pursuant to 
a 90-day Listing Agreement entered into between the Plaintiff 
-2-
and the Defendant, HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, on November 13, 
1973, which Agreement was approved and endorsed by substantially 
all of the stockholders of the company at a subsequent meeting 
held November 19, 1973. (See Exhibit IP). The Listing Agreement 
is on the printed form used for many years and approved by the 
Salt Lake Real Estate Board (See Exhibit 2). Objections to said 
Listing Agreement were not made until after the acceptance of an 
offer to purchase signed by all of the Directors of the defendant 
corporation. 
Plaintiff contends a bona fide offer to purchase was present-
ed and accepted by the Defendant, Heath Development Company, and 
approved at a meeting where all of the Directors were present, 
and said offer and acceptance were within the 90-day Listing Agree-
ment. The offer and acceptance allowed the purchasers 90 days, or 
until May 1st, to arrange financing. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 3). 
The record and testimony of all the witnesses called shows 
conclusively that the Defendant and all members of this family 
corporation had tried to sell the property for years; that the 
main topic of conversation at almost every stockholders1 meeting 
was in substance that all of the stockholders were getting along 
in years and unless the property was sold soon, each stockholder 
would soon be dead or too old to enjoy any return from the pro-
perty (Tr. 148 and following). 
-2-
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The foregoing facts were all established by documents 
signed by the parties and the signatures are acknowledged as 
genuine. The Plaintiff secured the financing but the Defend-
ants refused to perform prior to the expiration of the time 
for the execution of the documents and the actual consummation 
of the transaction. 
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to the six percent 
(6%) commission, plus costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorneys1 fee, because he performed his services and Defendants 
breached said contract by refusing to complete the transaction• 
Plaintiff admits the signatures of Etelen Young and Mary 
Francis Bennion were signed by their mother, Essie Heath, now 
deceased, and the signature of Lawrence T. Heath was signed by 
Carolyn Marler. But the Heath Development Company has been 
operated over the years in a very informal and unorthodox ..manner, 
more like a partnership than a corporation, so far as management 
is concerned, and the objection was not timely made but only 
after the refusal to complete the sale. 
Jurisdiction is not in dispute. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Statement found in Defendants1 Brief as to the disposition 
in the lower Court is correct. Also, the statement of the relief 
-3-
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THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED INTO BY ALL OF THE 
PARTIES PRESENT, WHICH CONSTITUTED OVER 80% OF THE STOCK AND 
WAS ACTED UPON BY PLAINTIFF IN GOOD FAITH. 
The statement that the January 13, 1973, Earnest Money 
Agreement was never properly signed or accepted by a properly 
constituted quorum of Heath Development Company and the contract 
created is voidable, is not at all accurate and does not apply 
to the facts of this case. 
This was and is a family corporation with members all re-
lated. Business was carried on in a very informal fashion. 
(See Exhibit 4, indicating the easy, informal manner in which 
the business of the family corporation was conducted and business 
was transacted.) 
In the case of Grover vs. Garn, 23 Utah 2d, page 441, Judge 
Faux stated at pages 445-6, as follows: 
"So we have the owners of substantially all of the 
stock of the corporation who were also the owners of 
the land before it came into the corporation as its 
primary asset, acting without the formality of a stock-
holders1 meeting or a written resolution in selling the 
primary asset of the corporation. More, they agreed in 
-4-
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the sale, that all payments should go from the buyers 
to Mr. and Mrs. Grover individually and to turn over 
the Garns property of Mr. Grover consisting of shares 
of water stock and rights for grazing cattle under 
the U. S. Taylor Grazing Act. While this latter facet 
of the whole contract may be termed a maverick and con-
cededly not a model for all corporate dealings yet as 
tendered in defense by the Garn defendants and res-
pondents we are not concerned here with a corporation 
having a multitude of stockholders situated over a 
wide expanse of the country. The two owners signed 
as vice president and secretary-treasurer of the sell-
er corporation on October 1, 1964. While we do not 
approve the method employed here and certainly denounce 
it as a pattern to be followed by corporations gener-
ally, we cannot disagree in this instance with the 
statement of law: 
"***but the trend of authority is to uphold as 
binding on the corporation acts or contract on its 
behalf by a person or persons owning all or practically 
all of the stock." 
It is stated in 18 Am Jur 2d, page 97, Section 485 as follows: 
"The acts or contracts of persons owning all or 
practically all of the stock of a corporation are 
binding on the corporation, at least where the 
rights of creditors of the corporation would 
not be prejudiced thereby. The unanimous action 
of all the stockholders may be binding as to 
them and the corporation, even though there was 
no formal meeting or no action by the Board of 
Directors. Contracts by a sole stockholder may 
be ratified by the Directors.* 
It is stated in 19 Am Jur 2d, pages 639-640, Section 1227, 
as follows: 
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"While a charter or statutory provision under 
which officers have power to convey is of course 
binding, the Board of Directors, in the absence 
of any charter or statutory limitation, has full 
authority to effectuate the corporation's power 
to convey the corporate realty and may authorize 
the officers to execute a conveyance thereof or 
make a contract for its sale. It has been held 
that express authority to sell real estate car-
ries with it authority to make a contract for 
its sale. * * *• 
Now counsel cites Runswick vs. FloorU6ut 91, 208 P2d 
949 (1949) and cites this language: 
"So long as corporate officers act fairly 
and in good faith, they are not precluded 
from dealing or contracting with the corpor-
ation merely because they are officers." 
This is certainly our case where business is conducted as 
herein stated by a small, informal group of family members. As 
to the balance of the quotation cited concerning a "disinter-
ested quorum being present, that certainly is not this case and 
does not apply here. 
Again counsel cites the case Fay L. Branch vs. Western 
Factors Inc. et al vs. Arnel Heaps 28 Ut 2d 361-501 P2d 570, 
with the point that a director occupies a fiduciary relationship 
to the corporation, and his personal dealings with the corpora-
tion may be avoided unless good faith and fairness are shown. 
Mr. Justice Ellett in the opinion states as follows: 
-6-
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"Where as in the execution of a trust deed here 
under consideration, there is an entire absence of a 
want of good faith, fraud and collusion, and the cor-
poration is yet a going concern, no sound principle 
of law prohibits a stockholder or director from deal-
ing with the corporation. A corporation is an arti-
ficial entity, and one of the principal objects of 
its creation is to contract with individuals in due 
course of business. This it may <$o with its direct-
ors and stockholders as well as w^ .th others; and 
under the weight of American authority, at least, 
contracts made by the corporation with its officers 
are not void per se, but at most Voidable merely, 
at the election of the corporation or its representa-
tives, within a reasonable time." 
Plaintiff, of course, has no quarrel with Judge Ellett's 
opinion herein stated, except that the tfacts in that case are 
entirely different and therefore have ndthina whatsoever to do 
with the case at bar. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THE VALIDITY OF THE 
CONTRACT AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF A TECHNICALITY IN THE PROCEDURE 
AS SET FORTH IN THE STATUTE, ESPECIALLY A SMALL FAMILY CORPOR-
ATION OF THIS KIND. 
It is stated in 19 C.J.S. at pages 714-15, as follows: 
"Each party to a corporate contract may be ee*~ 
topped to set up that the corporation neglected to 
observe some regulation that it should have observed 
before entering into the transaction. 
"Where an act done is within ihe corporate 
powers, and both parties to the transaction have 
proceeded as if all preliminary formalities had 
been complied with, and rights have attached, 
each party is estopped to set up, with a view 
-7-
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of defeating the rights of the other, that the 
corporation neglected to observe some regulation 
that it should have observed before entering in-
to the transaction. So, in general, a person 
dealing with one who is a proper officer to ex-
ecute a corporate contract is entitled to assume 
that such officer is acting regularly, and that 
all formalities of acts of the corporation and 
its affairs on which the right to execute the 
contract is conditioned have been performed, 
and the rights of such person will not be af-
fected because they have not been performed. 
A corporation will not be allowed to defend 
against an action on its contract on the ground 
that the provisions of its charter or a govern-
ing statute were not complied with, if it has 
received the consideration from the other party, 
particularly where the act was with the knowledge 
and consent of its stockholders. A corporation's 
successor, which receives the benefit of its con-
tract, is estopped from denying its liability 
thereon." 
In Taylor vs. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. 148 ALR 834# 
295 Ky 226, 173 SW 2d 377, it is said: 
"The action of directors, when exercised in 
good faith and not in fraud of the rights of the 
stockholders, is not subject to the latter1s con-
trol, and will not be interfered with by the 
Courts." 
In the case of Peterson vs. Holmgren Land & 
Livestock Company, 12 Utah 2nd 12 5, 363 P2d 786 (1961) the Court 
held: 
"Wade C. J. A contract for the sale of 
realty was enforceable against corporate vendor, 
even if the minutes of the Board of Directors 
were insufficient to show express authorization, 
where the corporation was a family corporation, 
-8-
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articles provided for acquirement and alienation 
of realty and there was binding ostensible au-
thority in its president." 
13 Am. Jr. Sec. 890, pp. 871-72, states: 
"If a corporate officer assuming to contract 
on behalf of the corporation is one to whom au-
thority to make such a contract m^y be given, a 
person dealing with him in good f^ith is not af-
fected by the fact that the proper steps to clothe 
him with were not taken." 
Again in 19 Am. Jr. Sec. 1164, p. 590, the same 
principle is stated: 
"The fundamental and well-settled rule is 
that when, in the usual course of the business 
of a corporation, an officer or other agent is 
held out by the corporation or has been permitted 
to act for it or manage its affairs in such a way 
as to justify third persons who deal with him in 
inferring or assuming that he is doing an act or 
making a contract within the scope of his au-
thority, the corporation is bound thereby, even 
though such officer or agent has riot the actual 
authority from the corporation to do such an act 
or make such a contract. This authority is known 
as apparent or ostensible authority. This ap-
parent authority is materially the same and is 
based upon the same principles as authority by 
estoppel. Stating the rule in terms of estoppel, 
a corporation, which, by its voluntary act, 
places an officer or agent in such a position or 
situation that persons of ordinary prudence, con-
versant with business usages and tihe nature of 
the particular business, are justified in assum-
ing that he has authority to perform the act in 
question and deal with him upon that assumption, 
is estfcpped as against such persons from denying 
the officerfs or agent's authority." 
-9-
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In the case of Baker vs. Glenwood Mining Co., 82 Utah 100, 
21 P2d 889, Justice Folland stated at page 107 the following: 
"This Court is committed to the doctrine that 
where a corporation has received the benefits of a 
contract, and while it still retains the fruits 
thereof, it will be estopped from urging as a de-
fense that the contract was ultra vires the corpor-
ation or the corporate officers were without au-
thority with respect thereto." 
See also Zions Savings Bank & Trust Co., vs. Tropic & 
East Rock Irr. Co., 102 Utah, 101, 126 P2d 1053. 
POINT III 
THE CORPORATE ENTITY IN THE CASE AT BAR WITH ITS SMALL, INFORMAL 
FAMILY GROUP ACTED PROPERLY AND THE COURT CONSIDERED THE SALE 
PROPER. 
In the case of Shaw vs. Bailey-McCune Company, et al.f 
11 Utah 2d page 93, Justice Callister states at page 95: 
"Under some circumstances the corporate entity may 
be disregarded in the interest of justice in such cases 
as fraud, contravention of law or contract, or public 
wrong. * * *. 
"Moreover, the conditions under which the corpor= 
ate entity may be disregarded or the corporation be 
regarded as the alter ego of the stockholders vary 
according to the circumstances in each case inas-
much as the doctrine is essentially an equitable 
one and for that reason is particularly within the 
province of the trial court." 
It is stated in 9 ALR 2d at page 1309, as follows: 
"Quite naturally it has been held — in fact 
no other conclusion would seem logical—that a cor-
poration created under corporate reorganization 
statutes with a view to ultimate liquidation of 
-10-
the corporation, and operated in the mean-
time for the purpose of salvaging whatever 
amounts it can for the benefit of bond-
holders or creditors may sell all the as-
sets of the corporation. 
"For the convenience of the user ex-
amples of the tests of the types of legislative 
enactments characteristic of those found in 
the cases herein discussed are presented here-
with: 
"No corporation shall sell. . . . all or 
substantially all of the property and assets 
. . . unless under authority of a resolution 
of its Board of Directors arid with the ap-
proval of the principal terms of the trans-
action and the nature and amount of the con-
sideration by vote or written consent of (the) 
shareholders." See Jeppi v. Brockman Holding 
Co. (1949) 34 Cal 2d (Adv 10) 206 P2d 847, 
9 ALR 2d 1297. 
"Every corporation may, by a vote of the 
majority of the stock entitled to vote, sell 
and convey or authorize to be conveyed, all or 
any portion of the property owned by it, or 
mortgage or lease any such property whenever 
it shall be necessary for its business or the 
protection or benefit of its property.* See 
Fontaine v. Brown County Motors Co., (1947X 
251 Wis. 433, 29 NW 2d 744, 174 ALR 694." 
In Union Trust Co. vs. Carter (Fed.) supra, 
it appeared that a corporation was formed, by 
the charter of which it was provided that the 
stockholders thereof might not vote, or control 
the management of the corporation in any way, 
the entire control thereof being delegated to. 
the directors, who were given power to do all 
that the stockholders might ordinarily do. The 
directors of the corporation, which had been 
-11-
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formed to sell certain property sold all of 
its property to a fellow director. The com-
plainant , a stockholder, thereupon sought to 
enjoin the transfer of the property to a 
vendee. It was held that since the stockholders 
had provided rules for the management of the cor-
poration they must be guided thereby, and that, 
since the sale in question was a matter coming 
within the provision, the stockholders of the 
corporation were necessarily bound. The result 
of the by-law was to authorize the directors to 
sell the property.J? 
It is stated in 5 ALR page 930-931 as follows: 
"Where a corporation is a going and solvent 
concern, and has corporate power to sell its pro-
perty in the ordinary course of the corporate 
business, the directors may make such sales with-
out the consent of the stockholders. Buell v. 
Buckingham (1864) 16 Iowa 284, 85 Am. Dec. 516; 
McCloskey v. New Orleans Brewing Co. (1911) 128 
La. 197, 54 So. 738. And see the reported case 
(Hendren v. Neeper, ante, 927) . 
"The directors are ordinarily intrusted with 
the management of the corporate business. McCloskey 
v. New Orleans Brewing Co. (La.) Supra, wherein 
it was said that stockholders cannot take.the 
business out of the hands of the Board of Directors 
without very good cause.'" 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF 
AS BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT. 
There is no conflict of interest on the part of Plaintiff 
as between Plaintiff and Defendant. All four of the Directors 
were aware of and knew the terms of the Listing Agreement and 
-12-
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knew the signing of the Earnest Money Agreement would make the 
Corporation obligated to pay the real estate commission accord-
ing to the terms of the Listing Agreement. The four individuals 
also were the holders of over eighty percent (80%) of the voting 
stock of the Corporation. 
Upon signing the Earnest Money Agreement a valid contract 
was created. The Plaintiff had earned his commission and was 
entitled to be paid providing the purchasers could come up with 
the money within the allotted time. All parties, corporation, 
and otherwise, knew Plaintiff would work to arrange financing 
(Ex. 3). Plaintiff was able to do this (Tr. 15-26) where the 
bank representative testified a loan had been approved that 
would enable purchasers to comply with the Earnest Money Agree-
ment. Only at that late date did the Defendant refuse to exe-
cute the deed and thereby breached its contract with Plaintiff. 
It may be noted here that a son-in-law of the President of the 
Corporation who owned no voting stock and whose wife owned less 
than one share of stock, instructed the President of the Corpor-
ation what to do. In fact, the evidence indicated his action 
could be described as intimidating. No cbrporation meeting had 
been held to determine that the contract betwen the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant should be breached or tfrat the contract was 
to be voided. This was simply an arbitrary breach of contract 
-13-
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induced by a relative who had no direct interest in the Cor-
poration as a stockholder or officer. The nearest thing to an 
interest on the part of Mr. Flinders would be to keep the pro-
perty in the Corporation until his wife inherited the interest of 
the President of the Corporation. 
The contract between Plaintiff and Defendant was not one 
with conflict of interest problems and was not void or voidable. 
The Plaintiff acted in complete candor and good faith, and full 
disclosures were made at all times. There is no tint of bad 
faith or any improperactivity on the part of the Plaintiff. 
If the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant can be ig-
nored and broken, then it is difficult to conceive of a real 
estate sale where the seller could not break the Agreement with 
impunity. All of the cases cited by the Defendant go to the 
question of the rights as between seller and purchaser, but not 
to the obligation of the Defendant to the Plaintiff. 
If the Heath family here involved wished to impune the 
motives of each other, the law does not require that plaintiff 
be denied its proper compensation. The Plaintiff has fully per-
formed and complied with the terms of its contract with the De-
fendant and is entitled to be paid. There is no conflict of 
interest as between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
-14-
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One hundred percent (100%) of the Directors and in excess 
of eighty percent (80%) of the stockholders approved the con-
tract to sell, and both the Corporation and the individuals in-
volved approved the original Listing Agreement. All of the 
stockholders and directors approved the Listing Agreement (Ex.1). 
Again, in the case cited above, Taylor vs. Axton-Fisher 
Tobacco Company, the Court said: 
"If in a particular instancy where the action 
taken by directors creates rights in another, they 
cannot thereafter alter or affect those rights to 
his prejudice." 
Central Idaho Agency, Inc. v. Clara Turner, 92 Idaho 306 
442 P2d p. 442: 
"Pursuant to terms of exclusive Listing Agree-
ment contract Plaintiff broker in suit for com-
mission would be entitled to Summary Judgment 
against land owner only if it were conclusively 
established that Plaintiff produced buyer ready, 
willing and able to purchase th0 realty under 
terms authorized by the Agreement or under terms 
acceptable to the Defendant. * * *." 
McMenamin v. Bishop, 6 Washington Appeals 455, 493 Pac.2d 
1016: 
"Exclusive real estate Listing Agreement pro-
viding that vendor would be liable to broker for 
the commission if she withdrew the broker's au-
thority prior to expiration of listing, was a bi-
lateral contract. Thus, where broker made bona 
fide and continuous effort to procure purchaser 
by advertising the property approximately 17 times 
-15-
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in local newspaper and showing the property to six 
or seven prospective purchasers, vendor was liable 
for the commission when she refused to complele sales 
transaction even if she had revoked the Agreement." 
Hoyt vs. Wasatch Homes, 1 Ut 2d, p. 9, 261 Pac.2d 927: 
"That Agreement certainly contemplates that 
the Plaintiff would cooperate in good faith toward 
the accomplishment of the purpose for which he em-
ployed Defendant. He cannot be permitted to pro-
cure them to obtain a buyer on terms acceptable to 
the Plaintiff and then prevent the accomplishment 
of what he requested and authorized them to do by 
arbitrarily refusing to perform his part of the 
transaction. Under such circumstances he will 
not be heard to complain of their failure to do 
that which he prevented." 
Sargent vs. Ritchey 233 Pac.2d 1619 (Washington): 
"Unless the broker or his employer have ex-
pressly stipulated to the contrary, the broker is 
entitled to his compensation upon the completion 
of the negotiations he undertook irrespective of 
whether or not the contract negotiated is ever 
actually consummated, so long as the failure to 
carry it through to a successful completion is 
not due to any fault of the broker." 
SUMMARY 
The Plaintiff in this case acted in good faith, performed 
the service for which he was hired and the duly elected, quali-
fied and acting Board of Directors engaged him to so perform. 
The fact that some of the officers had sellers1 remorse or 
thought they could make a better deal some place else has no 
-16-
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place in the law. 
It should be noted that over 80% of jthe stock was repre-
sented at the meeting on January 13, 1974^ wnen the Earnest 
Money Agreement was approved. The sale, ^ o far as the Plaintiff 
herein was concerned, was completed and his commission earned. 
The financing was approved as shown by th^ testimony (Tr. p.71-72), 
before the deadline as provided in the Agreement. This, there-
fore, appears to be a simple case of a seller*' remorse and the 
stockholders in this family corporation backing out of an agree-
ment after the Plaintiff had completed anc$ fulfilled his part 
of the contract, and Plaintiff should therefore recover his com-
mission as prayed for in his Complaint. 
The Listing Agreement was in conformity with the require-
ments of the Articles of Incorporation, ar|d was also approved 
at a meeting of substantially all of the Stockholders. 
The authority to sell the property off a corporation by its 
Directors has long been the law of Utah. As early as 1919 in 
the case of Beggs vs. Myton Canal & Irr. do., 54 Utah 120, 179 
Pac. 984, the Court said, at Page 125-6: 
"* * * Considering the selction as a whole, 
the manifest legislative intent is that all 
corporations in this State ma^, through their 
directors and upon confirmation by a vote of 
a majority in amount of the outstanding stock, 
-17-
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dispose of the corporate property when such 
disposition is not provided for in the Articles 
of Incorporation. And when the Articles of In-
corporation provide that the property of the 
corporation may be sold by the directors or by 
the stockholders, sales made in accordance with 
such provision will be binding upon the corpora-
tion. Whether such corporation be organized for 
mining purposes, or for other purposes, under the 
general incorporation laws of the State, our 
statute gives private corporations the power to 
sell and dispose of their property upon confirma-
tion by the majority in amount of the outstand-
ing stock. No further authority need be invoked 
in this case. The rule, however, is well settled 
that failing or unsuccessful corporations may 
sell and dispose of their property provided the 
transactions are not in fraud of the rights of 
creditors." 
It should also be noted that all of the qualified directors 
were present at the time the Earnest Money Agreement was exe-
cuted. It has been admitted that Sandra Flinders did not own 
one share of common stock as required by the Articles of Incor-
poration and there had been no actual transfer of a share to 
her on the books of the Corporation. 
It would therefore appear to Plaintiff that this is a 
simple case of sellers changing their minds or backing out of 
the deal after the Plaintiff had performed all of his part of 
the Listing and Earnest Money Agreements for the sale of the 
property. 
Mrs. Heath, herself, on cross examination, admitted that 
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her only reason for refusing to sigri the deeds was some second 
thoughts which she had after talking) to the husband of Sandra 
Flinders at the time she, Mrs. Flinders, owned less than one 
full share. (Tr. 8), and Mr. Flinders owned no voting stock. 
We therefore submit that the Judgment should be affirmed. 
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